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To examine intrahousehold secondary transmission 
of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus in households in Victoria, 
Australia, we conducted a retrospective cross-sectional 
study in late 2009. We randomly selected case-patients 
reported during May–June 2009 and their household 
contacts. Information collected included household 
characteristics, use of prevention and control measures, 
and signs and symptoms. Secondary cases were defi ned 
as infl uenza-like illness in household contacts within the 
specifi ed period. Secondary transmission was identifi ed 
for 18 of 122 susceptible household contacts. To identify 
independent predictors of secondary transmission, 
we developed a model. Risk factors were concurrent 
quarantine with the household index case-patient, and a 
protective factor was antiviral prophylaxis. These fi ndings 
show that timely provision of antiviral prophylaxis to 
household contacts, particularly when household members 
are concurrently quarantined during implementation of 
pandemic management strategies, delays or contains 
community transmission of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus.
Households play a major role in secondary transmission of pandemic infl uenza. Modeling estimates that 
household transmission has accounted for 25%–40% of all 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 cases (1,2). Although understanding 
the effect of individual-level and household-level factors 
on secondary transmission of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
is paramount to informing population-level prevention 
strategies, few studies have evaluated household-level risk 
factors (3–8).
The Australian Health Management Plan for Pandemic 
Infl uenza (AHMPPI), revised in 2008, provides a framework 
for preparedness and response to pandemic infl uenza (9). 
The emergence and magnitude of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
in Melbourne, Australia (10–15), coupled with intensive 
follow-up and case identifi cation data collected during the 
delay and contain phases of the AHMPPI (16), presented 
a unique opportunity to characterize intrahousehold 
transmission during a period of community transmission. 
Introduction of a suite of prevention and control measures 
in accordance with AHMPPI also provided an opportunity 
to measure the effects of these interventions on pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 virus transmission. 
We therefore conducted a retrospective cross-
sectional study of index case-patients and their household 
contacts in Melbourne (population >3.5 million), Australia 
(17). We examined transmission of pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 in households, identifi ed possible risk factors for 
intrahousehold secondary transmission, and assessed the 
effects of prevention and control measures introduced to 
limit transmission.
Methods
Participants 
The sample population consisted of all persons with 
confi rmed cases of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 reported to the 
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Victorian Department of Health (VDOH) during the delay 
and contain phases of AHMPPI (May 18–June 3, 2009) 
from 2 neighboring municipal regions in Melbourne with 
high numbers of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 notifi cations. 
To ensure that only the fi rst reported case in a household 
could be randomly selected, we fl agged households with 
>1 confi rmed case. The index case-patient and household 
contacts were then recruited by mail and telephone (up to 
5 calls were attempted). Of those who could be contacted, 
we assessed the household’s eligibility according to the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics defi nition of a family 
(households of >2 persons residing together, including at 
least 1 person <18 years of age, related by blood, marriage, 
de facto, adoption, or fostering) (18).
Data Collection
During November 18–December 21, 2009, inter-
viewers administered questionnaires to index case-patients 
and their household contacts. Data collected included 
demographics, case details, and prevention and control 
measures used. Participants indicated dates of symptom 
onset and prevention and control measures used in a 
retrospective diary of the period of interest (May 11–
June 14, 2009). Interpreters were used as requested or 
needed. A parent or guardian was also interviewed when 
a participant was <18 years of age. If a household member 
was not available, a parent, guardian, or partner provided 
information. Written informed consent was obtained for 
all participants; parents or legal guardians provided written 
informed consent for participants <18 years of age.
Defi nitions
Index case-patients were defi ned as patients with the 
fi rst laboratory-confi rmed case of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
in a household reported to the VDOH. Household contacts 
were defi ned as persons residing in the same household at 
the time of the index case-patient’s symptom onset.
Cultural and linguistic diversity was defi ned as 
speaking English only or speaking languages other than 
English in the home. The latter category included those 
households in which English was a second language.
A secondary case-patient was defi ned as a household 
contact who met the case defi nition for having an infl uenza-
like illness (ILI), defi ned as self-described fever plus chills 
and/or respiratory tract signs or symptoms such as cough, 
sore throat, or shortness of breath with onset 1–9 days after 
onset for the index case-patient. This interval was based 
on a serial interval (the number of days between symptom 
onset in the index case-patient and household contacts) of 
up to 9 days to identify secondary cases, given that shedding 
of seasonal infl uenza virus rarely lasts >8 days (7,19) and 
a median incubation period for seasonal infl uenza of ≈1.4 
days (7,20). Secondary cases were not required to be 
laboratory confi rmed. Household contacts who met our 
defi nition for having ILI but who reported symptom onset 
on the same day as or before that of the index case-patient 
were not considered to be at risk for secondary transmission 
and were not included in analysis for exposures associated 
with secondary transmission.
Use of antiviral drugs (treatment or prophylaxis) 
was self-reported. VDOH provided antiviral treatment to 
those who met the case defi nition (confi rmed or suspected 
case) and whose symptom onset was within 48 hours and 
provided antiviral prophylaxis to household contacts. 
Quarantine was self-reported and defi ned as separation and 
restriction of movement of case-patients and contacts in 
their homes (21). During the contain phase, patients with 
confi rmed cases were advised to quarantine themselves for 
7 days after symptom onset, and contacts were advised to 
quarantine themselves at home for 7 days after the most 
recent exposure to an infectious case-patient. A case-patient 
was considered infectious for 7 days after symptom onset 
or until acute respiratory symptoms resolved, whichever 
was longer (21).
Analysis
Chi-square tests were used to determine differences in 
clinical signs and use of prevention and control measures 
between index case-patients and household contacts. The 
Fisher exact test statistic, used to determine nonrandom 
associations between 2 categorical variables, was used when 
the expected value was <6. Secondary attack rates (SARs) 
were calculated by dividing the number of secondary cases 
by the total number of susceptible household contacts. 
We stratifi ed SARs for several potential predictors, 
including individual-level factors, prevention and control 
measures, and household-level factors. Potential predictors 
included gender, age group (0–4, 5–19, 20–49, >50 
years), relationship to index case-patient (parent/child, 
sibling, partner, other family member, or other), use of 
antiviral drugs (treatment or prophylaxis), number of 
days quarantined with index case-patient, household size 
(2–3, 4–5, >6 persons), number of children living in the 
household (1, 2, >3 children), and cultural and linguistic 
diversity (English only spoken at home and English and/or 
other languages spoken at home).
Unadjusted logistic regression was used to identify 
signifi cant candidate predictors (p<0.05) for inclusion in 
the fi nal adjusted model. The fi nal model used reverse 
stepwise selection procedures in which all signifi cant 
predictors of secondary transmission were included 
in the initial model and removed sequentially until 
only signifi cant predictors (p<0.05) remained. We 
accounted for household clustering in the unadjusted and 
adjusted logistic regression models; that is, we adjusted 
for dependency of all potential predictors based on 
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membership in the same household by using a generalized 
estimated equation with robust error estimates, assuming 
conditional independence within each family (i.e., within 
the family, each member had independent probability of 
becoming a case-patient). Goodness of fi t for both models 
was assessed by using the Hosmer–Lemeshow test to 0.05 
signifi cance. Statistical analyses were conducted by using 
Stata version 10 (StataCorp LP, College Station, TX, 
USA). To indicate precision of the measurement, we have 
reported 3 signifi cant (i.e., nonzero) fi gures.
Ethical Considerations
Participants were reimbursed with $A30. Ethical 
approval was obtained from the Alfred Hospital Ethics 
Committee and Australian National University Ethics 
Committee.
Results
Participation and Response Rates
Data extracted on October 20, 2009, contained 
records for 857 confi rmed cases of pandemic (H1N1) 
2009, representing 772 households, reported on or 
before June 3, 2009, including a total of 181 cases for 
persons residing in the selected municipalities. We then 
randomly selected 72 case-patients to participate in this 
study, of which 12 refused, 21 could not be contacted, 
and 3 did not meet eligibility requirements; the remaining 
36 index case-patients and their 131 household contacts 
participated. Participating and nonparticipating index 
case-patients were similar in age and student status; 
however, more nonparticipating (n = 4) than participating 
(n = 2) index case-patients required an interpreter. 
Among the 36 households that participated in the study, 
32 (88.9%) persons were interviewed face to face and 4 
(11.1%) were interviewed by telephone. Interpreters were 
used for interviews in 2 households.
Participant Characteristics
The analysis included 36 index case-patients and 
131 household contacts (Table 1). The age range of index 
case-patients was 6–47 years; that of household contacts 
was 1–74 years. The number of persons living in each 
household was 2–14, median 4.5 persons. The number of 
children living in each household was 1–7; most (75.0%) 
households had 1–2 children. In half of the households (n 
= 18), a language other than English was spoken at home.
Prevention and Control Measures
Antiviral treatment was taken by 30.6% of index case-
patients and 4.58% of all household contacts (Table 2). Just 
under half (45.8%) of all household contacts reported taking 
antiviral prophylaxis; and among those who did, 1 person 
reported subsequent symptoms consistent with ILI. The 
proportion of index case-patients and household contacts 
who reported being quarantined differed signifi cantly 
(88.9% and 69.5%, respectively, p = 0.013).
The median number of days to initiate quarantine was 
3 days for index case-patients and 4 days for household 
contacts. Greater than half (61.1%) of household contacts 
reported concurrent quarantine with the index case-patient 
for at least 1 day; the range of concurrent quarantine was 
1–15 days, median 4 days.
The median number of days before antiviral treatment 
was initiated for index case-patients and household 
contacts was 2 days (Figure 1). The median number of days 
before antiviral prophylaxis was initiated among household 
contacts was 6 days.
Clinical Features 
Among 131 household contacts, 122 (93.1%) were 
considered to be at risk for secondary transmission. Among 
these, 18 reported symptoms consistent with ILI within 
1–9 days of symptom onset for the index case-patient and 
were thus considered secondary case-patients (Figure 2). 
Household contacts who reported symptom onset before 
the index case-patient (n = 5), on the same day as the index 
case-patient (n = 4), or >9 days after onset of symptoms 
in the index case-patient (n = 3) were not considered to be 
secondary case-patients and were not included in analyses. 
The serial interval for secondary cases included in the 
analysis was 1–9 days, median 2 days.
With the exception of vomiting, clinical features 
reported by index and secondary case-patients did not differ 
signifi cantly (range p = 0.275–0.667, Table 3). The most 
frequent duration of symptoms for index and secondary 
case-patients was 4–6 days; 31.3% and 37.0% of index and 
secondary case-patients, respectively, reported symptom 
duration within this range. Approximately three fourths 
(77.8%) of secondary case-patients sought medical care 
(p = 0.01). Prevention or control measures used by index 
case-patients and secondary case-patients did not differ 
signifi cantly (quarantine p = 0.429, antiviral prophylaxis p 
= 0.429, antiviral treatment p = 0.095)
Secondary Transmission
The overall SAR in this study was 14.8% (95% 
confi dence interval [CI] 8.90%–22.3%, Table 4). The SAR 
varied when stratifi ed for different individual-level and 
household-level factors. In unadjusted analysis, predictors 
of intrahousehold secondary transmission were being 
female, concurrent quarantine with the index case-patient, 
and use of antiviral prophylaxis (Table 5). We did not fi nd 
a signifi cant association between secondary case-patients 
and age group, relationship to the index case, household 
size, number of children living in the household, or cultural 
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and linguistic diversity. In the adjusted analysis, p value for 
gender decreased from 0.037 to 0.83 and was thus removed 
from the fi nal model. In the fi nal model, the odds of a 
household contact who was concurrently quarantined with 
the index case-patient becoming a secondary case-patient 
increased for each additional day (adjusted odds ratio 1.25, 
95% CI 1.06–1.47), and the odds of secondary transmission 
among household contacts who reported use of antiviral 
prophylaxis decreased (adjusted odds ratio 0.042, 95% CI 
0.004–0.434). We did not identify a signifi cant interaction 
term to include in the multivariate model.
Discussion
This study fully characterizes transmission of 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in households in Australia during 
implementation of pandemic management strategies to 
delay or contain community transmission. The fi ndings 
are relevant for prevention and control strategies used 
at the household level indicated in the AHMPPI and for 
international pandemic infl uenza planning. Overall, 14.8% 
of susceptible household contacts became secondary case-
patients, assumed to have been infected by the index case-
patient. The SAR for ILI observed in this study is within 
the range of reported SARs for ILI used as a proxy for 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in similar international studies, 
which were 3.7%– 45% (4–8,22–27).
The odds of seeking medical care were lower for 
secondary than for index case-patients. Although this 
fi nding was expected because of the case ascertainment 
methods used, other factors involved with health care–
seeking behavior should be considered. For example, 
household contacts may have not sought care because 
VDOH provided antiviral treatment and prophylaxis 
to household contacts without requiring evidence of 
laboratory-confi rmed disease. Furthermore, symptomatic 
household contacts may have reasonably assumed that 
they were infected with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 given 
their proximity to a confi rmed case-patient and may not 
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Table 1. Characteristics of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 case-patients and household contacts, Victoria, Australia, May 18–June 3, 2009*
Characteristic
No. (%) index case-patients, 
n = 36 
No. (%) household contacts, 
n = 131 p value 
Individual level 
 Sex 
  M 25 (69.4) 69 (52.7) 0.07
  F 11 (30.6) 62 (47.3) 
 Age, y 
  0–4  0 13 (9.92) <0.001 
  5–19  31 (86.1) 40 (30.5) 
  20–49  5 (13.9) 68 (51.9) 
  >50 0 10 (7.63) 
Household level NA NA
 No. persons 
  2–3  5 (13.9) 
  4–5  22 (61.1) 
  >6 9 (25.0) 
No. children NA NA
 1  12 (33.3) 
 2  15 (41.7) 
 >3 9 (25.0) 
Cultural and linguistic diversity NA NA
 English only spoken at home 18 (50.0) 
 English and/or other language(s) spoken at home 18 (50.0) 
*NA, not applicable. 
Table 2. Prevention and control measures used by pandemic (H1N1) 2009 case-patients and household contacts, Victoria, Australia,
May 18–June 3, 2009* 
Reported measure 
No. (%) index case-patients, 
n = 36 
No. (%) household contacts, 
n = 131 p value† 
Antiviral
 Treatment 11 (30.6) 6 (4.58) <0.001 
 Prophylaxis 0 60 (45.8) <0.001 
Quarantine duration, d 
 >1 32 (88.9) 91 (69.5) 0.013 
 >1 with index case-patient NA 80 (61.1) 
*NA, not applicable. 
†Fisher exact test statistic used when expected value <6. 
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have considered confi rmation necessary. The differences 
in health care–seeking behavior have implications for 
the pandemic infl uenza response, particularly during the 
phases of the AHMPPI when emphasis is on active case 
fi nding and slowing community transmission. This fi nding 
highlights the need for timely household-level, rather than 
individual-level, provision of treatment and prevention 
strategies by health care professionals, at the point of care 
of the index case-patient.
Several individual-level and household-level factors 
infl uenced the SAR and the odds of secondary transmission 
within households. The odds of becoming a secondary 
case-patient were almost 3× greater for female than male 
contacts, possibly because more women assume caregiver 
roles and therefore having a greater likelihood of exposure. 
This explanation is supported by France et al. (4), who 
reported that providing care to a case-patient was associated 
with a higher risk for ILI among parents. A study with 
greater power may be able to demonstrate this association 
in adjusted analyses. Other studies have also reported 
fi ndings that older age was protective against secondary 
transmission of pandemic (H1N1) 2009, possibly as a result 
of prior immunity in older age groups (4,5). Although a 
decreasing trend of secondary transmission was observed 
for participants 5–19 years to 20–49 years of age, the size 
of this study was insuffi ciently powered to demonstrate 
a signifi cant association between age group and rate of 
secondary transmission.
Our fi nding that antiviral prophylaxis reduced the odds 
of secondary transmission by 95% among at-risk household 
contacts was greater than that reported by France et al., 
who reported a 68% reduction in risk (4). Although this 
fi nding highlights the potential for antiviral prophylaxis to 
prevent secondary transmission, it should be considered 
along with the fi nding that initiation of antiviral treatment 
and prophylaxis for index case-patients and household 
contacts was considerably delayed. Current evidence 
highlights that rapid implementation of prevention 
measures such as antiviral prophylaxis is critical for control 
of pandemic infl uenza as soon as community transmission 
is identifi ed; our fi ndings identify an area for improvement 
in the implementation of pandemic infl uenza management 
plans. For example, the need for timely use of antiviral 
prophylaxis was demonstrated by Donnelly et al., who 
found that only 18% of pandemic infl uenza transmission 
events take place >2 days after onset of symptoms in case-
patients (28). Ghani et al. also demonstrated this need when 
they reported a 3-fold increase in odds of intrahousehold 
secondary transmission in households that did not receive 
antiviral prophylaxis within 3 days of index case-patient 
symptom onset (2). Similarly, Goldstein et al. report 
that early antiviral treatment (on the day of or day after 
symptom onset) reduced the odds of household secondary 
transmission by 42% (29).
The issue of timeliness was also identifi ed with regard 
to initiation of quarantine. We identifi ed a considerable 
delay between onset of symptoms in the index case-patient 
and initiation of quarantine for index case-patients and 
household contacts, thus prolonging community exposure 
to pandemic (H1N1) 2009. Quarantine of case-patients 
and close contacts is considered an essential strategy for 
mitigating community transmission of pandemic infl uenza 
(9); however, to reduce the rate of community transmission, 
case-patients need to be quarantined as early as possible 
during their infectious period.
Although quarantine has been demonstrated to be 
effective at reducing community attack rates in pandemic 
infl uenza modeling studies, it has been hypothesized 
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Figure 1. Timeliness of quarantine initiation and administration 
of antiviral (treatment and prophylaxis) by pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 index case-patients and household contacts after onset 
of symptoms in the index case-patients, Melbourne, Victoria, 
Australia, May 18–June 3, 2009. 
Figure 2. Serial interval for symptom onset in pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 index case-patient to symptom onset in secondary case-
patients, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia, May 18–June 3, 2009.
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that the subsequent increase in contact rates between 
household members during quarantine may increase 
intrahousehold transmission (30). We found evidence 
supporting this hypothesis, demonstrating that the odds 
of secondary transmission increased >20% for each 
additional day of quarantine with the index case-patient. 
Similar effects of quarantine on intrahousehold secondary 
attack rates have not been reported for pandemic (H1N1) 
2009; however, a study of university students in the 
People’s Republic of China found an increased attack 
rate among contacts who shared a room or bathroom with 
confi rmed pandemic (H1N1) 2009 case-patients (31), 
and a study in New York reported increased risk between 
siblings who interacted closely with the index case-patient 
(4). Thus, to prevent community transmission, effective 
communication to confi rmed case-patients as well as 
their household contacts to ensure timely implementation 
of quarantine measures is needed. This fi nding should 
be considered along with previously discussed public 
health implications, including the recommendation for 
implementation of prevention and control measures at the 
household level rather than the individual level to ensure 
that messages reach household contacts. Furthermore, to 
counter the increased risk associated with quarantine with 
the index case-patient, quarantine should be implemented 
concurrently with distribution of antiviral prophylaxis to 
household contacts. 
The infl uence of cultural and linguistic diversity on 
secondary transmission served as a proxy for a range of 
social and environmental determinants of intrahousehold 
transmission of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 transmission, 
including recognition and understanding of health 
promotion messages and access to antiviral treatment 
and prophylaxis during the containment stages of the 
AHMPPI. A key fi nding was a higher SAR among persons 
who spoke languages other than English at home. This 
fi nding suggests that control and prevention measures 
were not effectively communicated, comprehended, and 
adhered to by a major community subset in Victoria. 
Although a higher SAR was observed among persons 
who spoke languages other than English at home, the 
study had insuffi cient power to provide evidence for the 
relative contribution of cultural and linguistic diversity on 
secondary transmission. Nonetheless, the potential issues 
associated with effective communication, comprehension, 
and adherence to prevention and control measures by 
cultural and linguistically diverse communities suggest 
that further work should explore the social and cultural 
determinants of pandemic (H1N1) 2009.
This study has some limitations. First, it was subject to 
recall bias, which we attempted to reduce by using tools to 
improve accurate recall of illness (such as case notifi cation 
information from VDOH and calendars of major events that 
occurred during the period of interest). Second, information 
bias may have been introduced by household members who 
provided information for household contacts not available 
at the time of interview. This bias occurred during a few 
interviews; however, any information bias is likely to 
underestimate the true association between exposures and 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009. Third, ILI was used as an indicator 
for pandemic (H1N1) 2009, and thus some misclassifi cation 
may have occurred. However, because sentinel surveillance 
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Table 3. Clinical features for pandemic (H1N1) 2009 case-patients and household contacts, Victoria, Australia, May 18–June 3, 2009 
Feature 
No. (%) index case-patients, 
n = 36 
No. (%) secondary case-patients, 
n = 18 p value* 
Sign or symptom 
 Fever 35 (97.2) 18 (100) 0.67
 Chills 17 (47.2) 8 (44.4) 0.54
 Headache 25 (69.4) 13 (72.2) 0.55
 Muscle pain 20 (55.6) 8 (44.4) 0.32
 Joint pain 15 (41.7) 7 (38.9) 0.54
 Fatigue 30 (83.3) 16 (88.9) 0.46
 Diarrhea 8 (22.2) 2 (11.1) 0.28
 Vomiting 16 (44.4) 2 (11.1) 0.01
 Upper respiratory tract symptoms 32 (88.9) 17 (94.4) 0.45
Sign or symptom duration, d 
 1–3  9 (25.0) 2 (11.2) 0.49
 4–6  13 (36.1) 9 (50.0) 
 7–9  9 (25.1) 3 (16.7) 
 >10 5 (13.8) 4 (22.2) 
Any medical care received 36 (100) 14 (77.8) 0.01
Reported prevention and control measures taken 
 Quarantine 32 (88.9) 15 (83.3) 0.43
 Antiviral prophylaxis 0 1 (5.56) 0.43
 Antiviral treatment 11 (33.3) 2 (11.1) 0.10
*Fisher exact test statistic used when expected value was <6. 
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indicated that most respiratory infections during the same 
period were pandemic (H1N1) 2009, misclassifi cation was 
probably minimal (32). Fourth, recruitment of households 
on the basis of the confi rmed status of 1 household member 
may introduce selection bias; however, during the study 
period, rates of testing of persons with mild to severe 
illness were high, and thus household contacts should be 
representative of infl uenza infections in the community. 
Fifth, the sample size was small; nonetheless, we identifi ed 
several factors signifi cantly associated with secondary 
transmission of pandemic (H1N1) 2009. Sixth, some ILI 
might be community acquired and therefore overestimate 
the rate of secondary transmission; we attempted to mitigate 
any overestimation by excluding concurrent primary cases 
and household contacts who reported symptom onset 
before that of the index case-patient.
Our study fi ndings can aid the continued development 
of future pandemic infl uenza preparedness plans in 
Australia and internationally. In particular, the provision 
of treatment and prevention strategies at the household 
level, rather than at the individual level alone at the point 
of care of the index case-patient, should be considered. 
The need for engagement at the household rather than 
the individual level is further emphasized by the benefi t 
of timely provision of antiviral prophylaxis to household 
contacts, particularly when household contacts are 
quarantined concurrently with the index case-patient. The 
integration of these practical fi ndings in the development 
of pandemic infl uenza preparedness plans in Australia 
and internationally can help reduce the potential for 
intrahousehold transmission of infl uenza during future 
pandemics.
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Table 4. Secondary attack rates for susceptible household contacts of index case-patients with pandemic (H1N1) 2009, Victoria, 
Australia, May 18–June 3, 2009* 
Variable
Total no. household 
contacts
No. with influenza-
like illness 
Secondary attack rate, % 
(95% CI) 
Individual-level associations  
 Sex 
  M 58 5 8.62 (1.08–14.4) 
  F 64 13 20.3 (11.3–32.2) 
 Age, y 
  0–4  11 1 9.09 (0.230–41.3) 
  5–19  35 6 17.1 (6.50–33.6) 
  20–49  66 10 15.2 (7.51–26.1) 
  >50 10 1 10.0 (0.25–44.5) 
 Relationship to index case-patient 
  Parent/child/partner 65 10 15.4 (7.63–26.5) 
  Sibling 44 8 18.2 (8.19–32.7) 
  Other family member 13 0 0 (0–24.7) 
Prevention and control measures reported 
 Antiviral prophylaxis 57 1 1.8 (0.04–9.39) 
 Quarantined >1 d with index case-patient 73 15 20.5 (12.0–31.6) 
Household-level associations 
 No. persons 
  2–3  7 2 28.6 (3.67–71.0) 
  4–5  75 10 13.3 (6.58–23.2) 
  >6 40 6 15.0 (5.71–29.8) 
 No. children  
  1  31 6 19.4 (7.45–37.5) 
  2  47 7 14.9 (6.20–28.3) 
  >3 44 5 11.4 (3.79–24.6) 
 Cultural and linguistic diversity 
  Only English spoken at home 53 5 9.4 (3.13–20.7) 
  English and/or other language(s) spoken at home 69 13 18.8 (10.4–30.1) 
*CI, confidence interval. 
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= 0.008. 
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